According to reports today, Microsoft is floating an idea to buy Yahoo's search biz and take a "minority passive stake" in the company. Please. This is nothing more than a fig leaf to cover Microsoft's renewal of acquisition discussions.
Look, it would have made things difficult for Microsoft to simply come out and said, after two weeks of avowed denials, that they still want to buy Yahoo. And it would be similarly hard for Yahoo to say they realized they'd overplayed their hand and they're really amenable to a deal at $33 or $34 per share. So, they can both engage in this barely-plausible cover story, spend a little time "examining" the pros and cons on an asset sale + investment, before concluding that it really makes the most sense for MSFT to simply acquire YHOO outright.
Monday, May 19, 2008
Wednesday, May 07, 2008
Clearwire, Sprint, etc.
Congrats to my former colleagues at Clearwire for FINALLY getting the Wimax JV done with Sprint. Initial indications are that it was worth the wait - it's a full-blown, fully-funded deal that removes a huge measure of risk from Clearwire's business and allows it to roll out nationally. What's more, Clearwire - despite only owning 27% of the new JV -gets to run the whole thing.
You know the cable guys and Google insisted on Clearwire running the show for more reasons than just concern over potential conflicts between Wimax and Sprint's cellular service. One look at Sprint's operational track record over the last couple of years would have been all it took to make that decision.
You know the cable guys and Google insisted on Clearwire running the show for more reasons than just concern over potential conflicts between Wimax and Sprint's cellular service. One look at Sprint's operational track record over the last couple of years would have been all it took to make that decision.
Yahoo-Microsoft
It's been highly amusing watching Yahoo step in it over the Microsoft proposal - I just hope they aren't deluding themselves into thinking that anything less than $6 - $8 of their current share price is due to speculation the deal will come back on.
Will it? Ballmer has taken some heat for how this was handled (one of his folks reportedly called MSFT's handling of last weekend's events "amateur hour" - ouch!), but if this was a tactical play by the mercurial Ballmer it may have been a good one. Yang and Decker have been falling over themselves to say they'd still be happy to deal, and have all but admitted Yahoo would take $33 a share.
So - there's still a decent shot this deal gets done. The price differential just isn't that great. Frankly, I wouldn't be surprised to see it get done for a buck or two less than MSFT's last offer of $33 when Yahoo comes back hat in hand to revive the deal.
Will it? Ballmer has taken some heat for how this was handled (one of his folks reportedly called MSFT's handling of last weekend's events "amateur hour" - ouch!), but if this was a tactical play by the mercurial Ballmer it may have been a good one. Yang and Decker have been falling over themselves to say they'd still be happy to deal, and have all but admitted Yahoo would take $33 a share.
So - there's still a decent shot this deal gets done. The price differential just isn't that great. Frankly, I wouldn't be surprised to see it get done for a buck or two less than MSFT's last offer of $33 when Yahoo comes back hat in hand to revive the deal.
Monday, March 10, 2008
Confidently Handling Legal Matters
People ask me what, exactly, we're doing here at Avvo. It's really quite simple - despite the stakes involved, consumers have precious little in the way of resources when it comes to getting legal guidance. The #1 source for consumer legal information is the Yellow Pages!
We're trying to change that by pulling more legal information and guidance together in one place than has ever been done before. For example:
Looking for an Albany NY criminal defense lawyer, Eliot Spitzer?
Need an Orange County bankruptcy attorney now that your ARM has reset?
How about getting some free answers on what do about your first DUI?
Central to Avvo is the mixing together of public records data and user-generated content to create rich profiles of attorneys. Those profiles, along with other resources like Avvo Answers, are designed to help consumers handle their legal matters with more confidence. I'd love to hear comments and suggestions on how we can do an even better job with this.
We're trying to change that by pulling more legal information and guidance together in one place than has ever been done before. For example:
Looking for an Albany NY criminal defense lawyer, Eliot Spitzer?
Need an Orange County bankruptcy attorney now that your ARM has reset?
How about getting some free answers on what do about your first DUI?
Central to Avvo is the mixing together of public records data and user-generated content to create rich profiles of attorneys. Those profiles, along with other resources like Avvo Answers, are designed to help consumers handle their legal matters with more confidence. I'd love to hear comments and suggestions on how we can do an even better job with this.
Tuesday, February 05, 2008
Google Breathes a Sigh of Relief
I suspect that when we see the identity of bidders in the FCC's 700 MHz auction (Auction 73), we'll see that Google was the last bidder on the package of licenses making up the C block covering all 50 states.
The last bid on that package, at about $4.7B - which came in about a week ago - was enough to push it over the reserve price and ensure that the so-called "open access" requirements Google lobbied for will apply to whoever wins the licenses. However, bids on the individual licenses comprising the package have been increasing in the interim, and have now exceeded the package price.
These bids are, without a doubt, coming from the incumbant telecoms. Google, not wanting to get into the capital-intensive, low-margin, highly-competitive network operator business, can now sit back, secure in knowing that it has acheived its lobbying end via a shill bidding strategy. It's an open question whether the "open access" requirements are truly meaningful - they are in many ways the final battle of yesterday's war, and far more toothless than what Google originally wanted. Still, you've got to admire the execution on Google's strategy here.
The last bid on that package, at about $4.7B - which came in about a week ago - was enough to push it over the reserve price and ensure that the so-called "open access" requirements Google lobbied for will apply to whoever wins the licenses. However, bids on the individual licenses comprising the package have been increasing in the interim, and have now exceeded the package price.
These bids are, without a doubt, coming from the incumbant telecoms. Google, not wanting to get into the capital-intensive, low-margin, highly-competitive network operator business, can now sit back, secure in knowing that it has acheived its lobbying end via a shill bidding strategy. It's an open question whether the "open access" requirements are truly meaningful - they are in many ways the final battle of yesterday's war, and far more toothless than what Google originally wanted. Still, you've got to admire the execution on Google's strategy here.
Microsoft's Yahoo! Bear Hug
A tremendous amount has been written about Microsoft's bid for Yahoo!, so just a quick note on my perspective:
- I absolutely love the bold approach. The level of the bid really only gives Yahoo management two options: Sell to MSFT or find a white knight. Convincing shareholders that independence is the best route to unlocking value would be a laughable exercise.
- Watching the flailing about by the tech media and Yahoo insiders for potential alternatives to MSFT has been highly amusing. Points for creativity, but none of these fantastical imaginings will come to pass.
- Google needs to watch itself. While it has vastly expanded its lobbying resources in the last few years, Google doesn't always show a lot of maturity. As a near-monopolist in search and internet advertising markets, it needs to be careful about making overstated objections to this merger that will come back to haunt it when it goes to make a big acquisition down the road.
- Microsoft has a lot of work to do. Getting this deal past the regulators will be no mean feat, particularly in Europe. However, the bigger issue will come in dealing with merger integration on a scale Microsoft has zero experience with. We'll want to check back in a few years on how this one works out.
- I absolutely love the bold approach. The level of the bid really only gives Yahoo management two options: Sell to MSFT or find a white knight. Convincing shareholders that independence is the best route to unlocking value would be a laughable exercise.
- Watching the flailing about by the tech media and Yahoo insiders for potential alternatives to MSFT has been highly amusing. Points for creativity, but none of these fantastical imaginings will come to pass.
- Google needs to watch itself. While it has vastly expanded its lobbying resources in the last few years, Google doesn't always show a lot of maturity. As a near-monopolist in search and internet advertising markets, it needs to be careful about making overstated objections to this merger that will come back to haunt it when it goes to make a big acquisition down the road.
- Microsoft has a lot of work to do. Getting this deal past the regulators will be no mean feat, particularly in Europe. However, the bigger issue will come in dealing with merger integration on a scale Microsoft has zero experience with. We'll want to check back in a few years on how this one works out.
Thursday, January 24, 2008
Diligence Stories
Absolutely terrific post by Equity Private regarding an undercover diligence mission. I agree completely that there is absolutely no reason to ever give a buyer anything resembling this kind of unfettered access. It must be controlled, time-limited and escorted - and preferably kept entirely off-site.
Note to EP - the problem with non-signed employee agreements you ran across is probably a non-issue, as standard employee non-competes are completely unenforceable in California.
Note to EP - the problem with non-signed employee agreements you ran across is probably a non-issue, as standard employee non-competes are completely unenforceable in California.
Thursday, January 03, 2008
More on ROWE
Cali and Jody’s ROWE (Results-Only Work Environment) blog – which hits dead-on so many of the inanities of our clock and face-time obsessed workplace culture – has a recent post regarding attorney billable hours, and the fact that clients are driving the push to rid the delivery of legal services from this archaic model.
Now, I’m sure most of these clients aren’t living the ROWE ideal, but at least there is a recognition that the results provided by legal services are not always – or even most of the time – linked to the time it takes to produce them. I spent less than three years working in a billable hours environment before entering the corporate world, but I hated it from the first. Ironically, part of the problem was the clients themselves, who had no problem paying for endless hours spent summarizing depositions or twiddling one’s thumbs in a courtroom status conference but would balk at time billed for conferences between the firm’s attorneys, to say nothing of paying on a sliding scale based on results.
Now, I’m sure most of these clients aren’t living the ROWE ideal, but at least there is a recognition that the results provided by legal services are not always – or even most of the time – linked to the time it takes to produce them. I spent less than three years working in a billable hours environment before entering the corporate world, but I hated it from the first. Ironically, part of the problem was the clients themselves, who had no problem paying for endless hours spent summarizing depositions or twiddling one’s thumbs in a courtroom status conference but would balk at time billed for conferences between the firm’s attorneys, to say nothing of paying on a sliding scale based on results.
On the Limits of Analysis
Ken Klee over at Corporate Dealmaker penned a brief review of a recent HBR article titled "Innovation Killers: How financial tools destroy your capacity to do new things." As Ken points out, any critique of the limitations of DCF analysis is highly applicable to dealmaking.
I've mentioned before my somewhat jaundiced view toward financial analysis and the reverence to which it is held in every big company I've worked with. While DCF analysis has its place, its limitations absolutely must be recognized.
As Ken points out, one problem is that fact that most DCF models are built on status quo assumptions (or corporate growth projections) that don't account for the strategic and competitive dimension. I would add that there is also the simple problem of garbage-in, garbage-out: the less you know about what's likely to happen (as is the case with new lines of business and transformational transactions), the less reliable the output of your DCF model becomes. The problem is that instead of acknowledging this limitation, many embrace the modeled output as Holy Writ. Besides being a false data crutch, it squeezes out consideration of other "softer" factors (like assumed competitive ramifications, or non-quantifiable synergies)that are every bit as worthy of consideration.
I've mentioned before my somewhat jaundiced view toward financial analysis and the reverence to which it is held in every big company I've worked with. While DCF analysis has its place, its limitations absolutely must be recognized.
As Ken points out, one problem is that fact that most DCF models are built on status quo assumptions (or corporate growth projections) that don't account for the strategic and competitive dimension. I would add that there is also the simple problem of garbage-in, garbage-out: the less you know about what's likely to happen (as is the case with new lines of business and transformational transactions), the less reliable the output of your DCF model becomes. The problem is that instead of acknowledging this limitation, many embrace the modeled output as Holy Writ. Besides being a false data crutch, it squeezes out consideration of other "softer" factors (like assumed competitive ramifications, or non-quantifiable synergies)that are every bit as worthy of consideration.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
New Gig
One reason for the slowing pace of my posting here is a change in focus - I've moved from Clearwire to Avvo, Inc., an internet start-up in Seattle dedicated to helping consumers with the daunting task of finding a lawyer. It's fun stuff, but my new role will likely have very little to do with the M&A issues I've been dealing with over the last five years. I may post on corp dev topics from time to time, but I will still be writing my column in Corporate Dealmaker magazine and will be contributing to the Avvo blog.
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Facebook and Microsoft
The long-awaited Microsoft-Facebook linkup was announced today, with my neighbors here in Redmond ponying up $240M for a minuscule 1.6% stake in Facebook.
While this deal values the fast-growing social networking site at $15B, I doubt valuation was much of an issue for Microsoft. Yes, it's huge for Facebook to get a massive infusion of cash with only nominal dilution, but Microsoft has more nuanced concerns. Whether MSFT gets a decent return on the quarter-billion invested is of far less concern than getting linkage with Facebook and beating out Google. Besides an expansion of an extant advertising deals, the remaining scope of the MSFT-Facebook linkage hasn't been disclosed.
Bottom line? Huge win for Facebook, although it won't be raising more capital at this valuation any time soon. It's also a win for Microsoft, which now gets to participate in Facebook's strategic upside, if not the financial upside it would have also gotten had it pulled the trigger a year or so ago.
While this deal values the fast-growing social networking site at $15B, I doubt valuation was much of an issue for Microsoft. Yes, it's huge for Facebook to get a massive infusion of cash with only nominal dilution, but Microsoft has more nuanced concerns. Whether MSFT gets a decent return on the quarter-billion invested is of far less concern than getting linkage with Facebook and beating out Google. Besides an expansion of an extant advertising deals, the remaining scope of the MSFT-Facebook linkage hasn't been disclosed.
Bottom line? Huge win for Facebook, although it won't be raising more capital at this valuation any time soon. It's also a win for Microsoft, which now gets to participate in Facebook's strategic upside, if not the financial upside it would have also gotten had it pulled the trigger a year or so ago.
Tuesday, October 02, 2007
Ebay's Skype Writedown
Following up and tracking the success of deals some years on is not always a strong suit for corporate dealmakers - often it's on to the next deal before the ink is dry, with little need for the nostalgia of looking back.
Accountants, however, have no such luxury, and there is a certain discipline to tracking over time how good your deals really are. With that in mind, I note Ebay's $1.4B writedown of its Skype acquisition, accompanied by the departure of Niklas Zennstrom and the announcement that the earnout in the deal had only been one-third met. With the original purchase price of $2.6B and about $500M in earnout money, the charge represents nearly 50% of deal value.
Ebay may have some internal measures that indicate the deal was a success for strategic reasons, but by any objective outside view it was a bust. I hate to say I told you so, but . . .
Accountants, however, have no such luxury, and there is a certain discipline to tracking over time how good your deals really are. With that in mind, I note Ebay's $1.4B writedown of its Skype acquisition, accompanied by the departure of Niklas Zennstrom and the announcement that the earnout in the deal had only been one-third met. With the original purchase price of $2.6B and about $500M in earnout money, the charge represents nearly 50% of deal value.
Ebay may have some internal measures that indicate the deal was a success for strategic reasons, but by any objective outside view it was a bust. I hate to say I told you so, but . . .
Thursday, September 27, 2007
Facebook Bonanza
I'm loving the Facebook rumors flying around here in Redmond right now - we've even got breathless reporting on Mark Zuckerberg sightings at the airport.
Microsoft is rumored to be paying $300-$500MM for 5% of Facebook, giving the social networking site a valuation of as much as $10B(!!). This, on $150MM in annual revenue, most of which is coming from MSFT already.
Facebook has enjoyed terrific growth, particularly over the last few months, and there's no question they've created something of value. That said, it boggles the mind to think that this site is game-changing enough to merit valuations in the double-digit billions. At the end of the day, this is an advertising-supported business that only six months ago was looking like an also-ran to MySpace. And, despite the robust growth, its users are characterized by low click-through rates on the site's advertising.
All this is by way of saying that Facebook would be insane to pass up an investment in this range, given the hefty valuation and nominal percentage of the company involved. The interesting part - and the area where a deal could fall apart for Facebook - is what kind of minority rights (or ancillary commercial deals) Microsoft gets along with its investment. $500MM is chump change for Microsoft; they can certainly take a flyer on Facebook - but they aren't going to do so unless the integrative side of the deal allows them to leverage Facebook across their other lines of business. Look for the details on this once the smoke clears on the crazy valuation.
Microsoft is rumored to be paying $300-$500MM for 5% of Facebook, giving the social networking site a valuation of as much as $10B(!!). This, on $150MM in annual revenue, most of which is coming from MSFT already.
Facebook has enjoyed terrific growth, particularly over the last few months, and there's no question they've created something of value. That said, it boggles the mind to think that this site is game-changing enough to merit valuations in the double-digit billions. At the end of the day, this is an advertising-supported business that only six months ago was looking like an also-ran to MySpace. And, despite the robust growth, its users are characterized by low click-through rates on the site's advertising.
All this is by way of saying that Facebook would be insane to pass up an investment in this range, given the hefty valuation and nominal percentage of the company involved. The interesting part - and the area where a deal could fall apart for Facebook - is what kind of minority rights (or ancillary commercial deals) Microsoft gets along with its investment. $500MM is chump change for Microsoft; they can certainly take a flyer on Facebook - but they aren't going to do so unless the integrative side of the deal allows them to leverage Facebook across their other lines of business. Look for the details on this once the smoke clears on the crazy valuation.
Thursday, August 09, 2007
More on MAC Clauses
I've posted before about MACs (material adverse change clauses; also called MAE - material adverse effect - clauses), particularly around the use of a MAC by Johnson & Johnson in trying to negotiate a lower price for Guidant. As we saw there, exercising a MAC is not only the M&A equivalent of nuclear war, it also can lead to unforeseen effects like an ultimately HIGHER price for the target company.
For those interested in learning more about the arcana behind the legal dimensions of MACs and why they are so hard to exercise, the M&A Law Prof Blog has an excellent post on that very subject.
For those interested in learning more about the arcana behind the legal dimensions of MACs and why they are so hard to exercise, the M&A Law Prof Blog has an excellent post on that very subject.
Wednesday, August 08, 2007
Sourcing Deals
In general, I think it easier to find deals as a strategic acquiror than it is when looking for investment opportunities in the VC or PE worlds. First, the universe of potential targets is a lot smaller, unless you work for General Electric. Secondly, although your financial models may not adequately account for this factor, there is, at some level of the corporate decision-making process, a built-in "strategic bias" favoring deals that help grow the business.
Assuming you're not operating within a global conglomerate or looking to expand inorganically into a new line of business, potential targets are going to be found primarily amongst your competitors and suppliers. For example, in the wireless industry we would do deals to acquire operating markets or raw spectrum from other carriers (competitors), acquire or sell towers to or from aggregators (suppliers), and acquire companies providing billing and other IT services (suppliers). In addition, there would be the occasional deal with a financial entity (speculators) to acquire spectrum assets, or a small company with something new and exciting to offer that wasn't currently a vendor (innovators).
In at least the first two groups, you should know who the potential targets are, at least for the most part. You probably already talk regularly with some of them. Others you may cold-call to get a discussion started, or they may hire bankers to approach you. Or your CEO might come back from a two-week camping trip with a deal in hand. In any event, deals with those categories of targets are not hard to get going.
Of the other two groups, the speculators are the easiest to locate - they will usually find you. The innovators are the tough ones to find. While this category may be of lesser importance in stable, slower-growing businesses, it's critical in many technology businesses to find and acquire these talents and ideas before the competition does. The problem of finding them could stem from not knowing where they might be, not knowing how to get your inquiries returned, or not being able to efficiently filter out the few good opportunities from the flood of dreck that is being thrown on your desk every day (an issue Google no doubt struggles with). More than ever, overcoming these issues requires those doing the deals to know as much as humanly possible about their company and the environment it operates in.
Assuming you're not operating within a global conglomerate or looking to expand inorganically into a new line of business, potential targets are going to be found primarily amongst your competitors and suppliers. For example, in the wireless industry we would do deals to acquire operating markets or raw spectrum from other carriers (competitors), acquire or sell towers to or from aggregators (suppliers), and acquire companies providing billing and other IT services (suppliers). In addition, there would be the occasional deal with a financial entity (speculators) to acquire spectrum assets, or a small company with something new and exciting to offer that wasn't currently a vendor (innovators).
In at least the first two groups, you should know who the potential targets are, at least for the most part. You probably already talk regularly with some of them. Others you may cold-call to get a discussion started, or they may hire bankers to approach you. Or your CEO might come back from a two-week camping trip with a deal in hand. In any event, deals with those categories of targets are not hard to get going.
Of the other two groups, the speculators are the easiest to locate - they will usually find you. The innovators are the tough ones to find. While this category may be of lesser importance in stable, slower-growing businesses, it's critical in many technology businesses to find and acquire these talents and ideas before the competition does. The problem of finding them could stem from not knowing where they might be, not knowing how to get your inquiries returned, or not being able to efficiently filter out the few good opportunities from the flood of dreck that is being thrown on your desk every day (an issue Google no doubt struggles with). More than ever, overcoming these issues requires those doing the deals to know as much as humanly possible about their company and the environment it operates in.
Monday, August 06, 2007
Free Drugs
Publix supermarkets announced today that the company will begin giving away seven popular prescription antibiotics. The articles on this development note that WalMart has been selling a number of popular generic medications for $4, and that several other pharmacies have moved in the direction of low cost/free prescriptions.
Amidst the laudatory statements of improving access to important medications, one notes that these seven medications represent nearly 50% of the generic prescriptions filled by Publix. Have you ever tried to comfort a crying child while waiting 15-20 minutes for a simple prescription to be filled? The reason it takes so long is the mind-numbing level of paperwork and authorizations a pharmacy must go through to get insurance authorization.
By making the medication free, Publix eliminates the need to deal with insurance issues on a massive volume of its pharmacy business. I don't know how much employee time this frees up for Publix, but I'm sure it greatly exceeds whatever the company pays for these generic medications. Fortunately, this is one of those rare cases where cost containment will actually lead to a better customer experience.
Amidst the laudatory statements of improving access to important medications, one notes that these seven medications represent nearly 50% of the generic prescriptions filled by Publix. Have you ever tried to comfort a crying child while waiting 15-20 minutes for a simple prescription to be filled? The reason it takes so long is the mind-numbing level of paperwork and authorizations a pharmacy must go through to get insurance authorization.
By making the medication free, Publix eliminates the need to deal with insurance issues on a massive volume of its pharmacy business. I don't know how much employee time this frees up for Publix, but I'm sure it greatly exceeds whatever the company pays for these generic medications. Fortunately, this is one of those rare cases where cost containment will actually lead to a better customer experience.
Friday, August 03, 2007
News Corp - Dow Jones Side Deals
Interesting but shoddy piece in yesterday's NYT about the "side deals" in the News Corp - Dow Jones deal whereby News Corp agreed to pay the sellers' banking and legal fees (totalling some $40M). Quoting several disgruntled Dow Jones investors and putative bidders, the article questions whether this side deal - and past banking and legal relationships between the parties - caused the advisors to give Dow Jones less-than-objective advice in pushing for a deal.
For starters, the entire thesis of this article is specious: Bankers, and firms like Wachtell that usually only bill for M&A work when a deal closes, ALWAYS have an incentive to see the deal get completed. ALWAYS. A seller asking for an 11th-hour concession (and one that here, at .7% of deal value, represented no more than a mere lagniappe in the context of the transaction) makes no difference in this dynamic. The sellers got a better deal by $40M - bully for them, and good for the advisors in obtaining it. They also got a 67% premium in the face of buyer perception that Bancroft family issues would make for a very difficult transaction.
That said, these folks are professionals who know far too well they value of their reputations and the need to be perceived as providing objective advice on whether to proceed with a deal. Given just how good this deal was for DJ investors, there's little need for them to defend their conduct. I would also observe that Wachtell, in representing DJ and all of the craziness involved in this deal with the Bancoft family, is not likely being overpaid in collecting $10M.
For starters, the entire thesis of this article is specious: Bankers, and firms like Wachtell that usually only bill for M&A work when a deal closes, ALWAYS have an incentive to see the deal get completed. ALWAYS. A seller asking for an 11th-hour concession (and one that here, at .7% of deal value, represented no more than a mere lagniappe in the context of the transaction) makes no difference in this dynamic. The sellers got a better deal by $40M - bully for them, and good for the advisors in obtaining it. They also got a 67% premium in the face of buyer perception that Bancroft family issues would make for a very difficult transaction.
That said, these folks are professionals who know far too well they value of their reputations and the need to be perceived as providing objective advice on whether to proceed with a deal. Given just how good this deal was for DJ investors, there's little need for them to defend their conduct. I would also observe that Wachtell, in representing DJ and all of the craziness involved in this deal with the Bancoft family, is not likely being overpaid in collecting $10M.
Wednesday, August 01, 2007
Results-Only Work Environment
I posted a bit about "Results-Only Work Environment" (or "ROWE") last year, in light of Best Buy's rolling out this concept at its HQ. At first blush, the name strikes me as faintly ludicrous - after all, aren't results the only thing that matters in the workplace?
It's a sad statement about how far from this headset so many corporate workplaces are that the creators of ROWE had to choose such an obvious name, but one hopes it serves as a daily reminder of what's important - and what's not - in the office. The concept of ROWE is a simple one; to quote CultureRx, the creators of ROWE:
"In a ROWE, people do whatever they want whenever they want as long as the work gets done. In the park, in a coffee shop, in the shower. At midnight or 3am or on Sunday. Whenever and wherever."
I'd take this as a manifesto of sorts - obviously not every job lends itself to a "whenever/wherever" working style, and sometimes acheiving results requires that the "whenever/wherever" be "in the office, this morning." The important distinction is that all questions of time, place and process are viewed through the lens of maximizing results, not face time or some antiquated notion of needing to clock a set number of hours each day in the office.
Of course, critical to making this work is that managers trust employees and employees take true ownership of getting results rather than filling a chair. It also means understanding that a) there are times you do all need to be together in the office to get the work done; and b) "reachability" and responsiveness become absolutely critical. Finally, it also means recognizing that some people get their best results by working in a corporate office for set hours.
The CultureRX site also has an amusing section on "sludge" - negative (and usually passive-aggressive) workplace language used to cast judgment on those who may not be filling their chairs as ardently as the sludge-slingers. Anyone who has spent quality time in a corporation has no doubt seen more than their share of this! I would add to this concept "sludge avoidance" - the subspecies of corporate type who constantly has to tell you how hard they are working, the sacrifices they are making to spend time in the office, etc.
It's a sad statement about how far from this headset so many corporate workplaces are that the creators of ROWE had to choose such an obvious name, but one hopes it serves as a daily reminder of what's important - and what's not - in the office. The concept of ROWE is a simple one; to quote CultureRx, the creators of ROWE:
"In a ROWE, people do whatever they want whenever they want as long as the work gets done. In the park, in a coffee shop, in the shower. At midnight or 3am or on Sunday. Whenever and wherever."
I'd take this as a manifesto of sorts - obviously not every job lends itself to a "whenever/wherever" working style, and sometimes acheiving results requires that the "whenever/wherever" be "in the office, this morning." The important distinction is that all questions of time, place and process are viewed through the lens of maximizing results, not face time or some antiquated notion of needing to clock a set number of hours each day in the office.
Of course, critical to making this work is that managers trust employees and employees take true ownership of getting results rather than filling a chair. It also means understanding that a) there are times you do all need to be together in the office to get the work done; and b) "reachability" and responsiveness become absolutely critical. Finally, it also means recognizing that some people get their best results by working in a corporate office for set hours.
The CultureRX site also has an amusing section on "sludge" - negative (and usually passive-aggressive) workplace language used to cast judgment on those who may not be filling their chairs as ardently as the sludge-slingers. Anyone who has spent quality time in a corporation has no doubt seen more than their share of this! I would add to this concept "sludge avoidance" - the subspecies of corporate type who constantly has to tell you how hard they are working, the sacrifices they are making to spend time in the office, etc.
Monday, July 30, 2007
Facebook Revisted
When, last winter, I last discussed the potential for a sale of Facebook, I urged the company to jump at the purported opportunity to cash out for north of $1B. Times have changed, and so has my opinion. Facebook has opened itself up, both to new classes of users and in an open-source way that is leading to explosive growth in applications centered around Facebook. These events have made the site a far more useful means for organizing information and connecting with others. Hell, even this corporate tool - who went to college well before e-mail and the web - now has a Facebook page.
I don't know where these applications will get to, or whether they will ever make any money for those developing them. And the Facebook interface, despite having some very nice features, has some strange quirks, particularly around e-mail. Nonetheless, it appears to be building into something quite a bit more valuable than I would have imagined a few months back.
I don't know where these applications will get to, or whether they will ever make any money for those developing them. And the Facebook interface, despite having some very nice features, has some strange quirks, particularly around e-mail. Nonetheless, it appears to be building into something quite a bit more valuable than I would have imagined a few months back.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
DealMaven
Discovered the DealMaven Blogs, which I've added to the short list of dealmaking links here at Corporate Tool. Lots of good stuff, particular for those starting out in development or banking, or anyone who spends a lot of time with financial analysis and modeling.
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